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Abstract
Workflows specify collections of tasks that must be executed under the respon-
sibility or supervision of human users. Workflow management systems and
workflow-driven applications need to enforce security policies in the form of
access control, specifying which users can execute which tasks, and authorization
constraints, such as Separation of Duty, further restricting the execution of tasks
at run-time. Enforcing these policies is crucial to avoid frauds and malicious use,
but it may lead to situations where a workflow instance cannot be completed
without the violation of the policy. The Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP)
asks whether there exists an assignment of users to tasks in a workflow such that
every task is executed and the policy is not violated. The WSP is inherently
hard, but solutions to this problem have a practical application in reconciling
business compliance and business continuity. Solutions to related problems, such
as workflow resiliency (i.e., whether a workflow instance is still satisfiable even in
the absence of users), are important to help in policy design. Several variations
of the WSP and similar problems have been defined in the literature and there
are many solution methods available. In this paper, we survey the work done on
these problems in the past 20 years.
Keywords: Workflow satisfiability, Workflow resiliency, Authorization
constraints
1. Introduction
A workflow specifies a collection of tasks, whose execution is initiated by
humans or software agents executing on their behalf, and the constraints on
the order of execution of those tasks. Workflows represent a repeatable and
structured collection of tasks designed to achieve a desired goal. They are used
to model business processes that capture the activities that must be performed
in a business setting to provide a service or product.
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Workflow enactment services provide the run-time environment that controls
and executes workflows. Both functional and non-functional requirements need
to be considered when implementing workflow-based applications [1]. Workflow
patterns for control-flow, data-flow, and organizational resources [2, 3, 4] can be
used to elicit functional requirements, whereas security-related dependencies are
specified in workflows as authorization policies and additional constraints on the
execution of the various tasks.
Authorization policies specify that, in an organization, a workflow task is
executed by a user who should be entitled to do so; e.g., the teller of a bank may
create a loan request, whereas only a manager may accept it. Additional autho-
rization constraints are usually imposed on task execution, such as Separation
or Binding of Duties (SoD or BoD) whereby two distinct users or the same user,
respectively, must execute two tasks. Workflows equipped with an authorization
policy and constraints may be called “security-sensitive” [5].
While the enforcement of authorization policies and constraints is fundamental
for security [6], it may also lead to situations where a workflow instance cannot
be completed because no task can be executed without violating either the
authorization policy or the constraints. These deadlock situations emphasize
the conflict between business compliance and business continuity. Business
compliance states that the business processes must follow the modeled workflows,
respecting control-flow constraints, authorization policies and authorization
constraints. Business continuity, on the other hand, states that the business
must not stop even in adverse conditions, e.g., in the absence of authorized
users. These conflicts may be resolved by an administrator granting additional
permissions to a user, which violates the original intended policy and therefore
hurts compliance. In alternative, an administrator can cancel the execution of a
business process instance, which violates business continuity. An ideal solution
is to avoid that any instance execution ever reaches a situation where this choice
must be made.
The Workflow Satisfiability Problem (WSP) consists of checking if there exists
an assignment of users to tasks such that a security-sensitive workflow successfully
terminates while satisfying all authorization constraints. The run-time version of
the WSP consists of answering sequences of user requests at execution time and
ensuring successful termination together with the satisfaction of authorization
policies and constraints. Such problems have been studied in several papers
and there are many available solutions. Other related problems have also been
studied in the literature. Workflow Resiliency amounts to checking if a workflow
can still be satisfied even in the absence of a certain number of users, while
Workflow Feasibility concerns the existence of a possible configuration of the
authorization policy (considering, e.g., delegation or administrative policies) in
which the workflow is satisfiable.
In this paper, we present a survey of the most relevant work in the areas of
workflow satisfiability, resiliency, and related problems. Despite the number of
published papers in these areas (Google Scholar returned 136 results to the query
“workflow satisfiability” on June, 2017) and the considerable time span of the
research (20 years, considering the work of Bertino et al. in 1997 [7] as the first),
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to the best of our knowledge, there is only one previous survey on WSP [8]. That
survey, however, is rather brief and only considers papers published until May
2014 (out of the 136 results described above, 59 have been published after 2015).
There is also a related survey by Leitner and Rinderle-Ma [6] that explores the
literature on security in process-aware information systems. Although there is
some overlap between [6] and this paper, the former is very broad, considering
several aspects of security. It is also brief when discussing workflow satisfiability
or resiliency (the problems are only mentioned, there is no discussion about the
solutions).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
methodology adopted for the survey and some statistics about the published
literature. Section 3 describes the specification of security-sensitive workflows,
which is necessary to understand the many variants of the WSP; Section 4
discusses solutions to the WSP; Section 5 does the same for the workflow
resiliency problem; Section 6 presents other related problems that have been less
studied; and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Methodology
The methodology used in this paper is similar to that of [6, 8], which, in
turn, follows widely accepted guidelines for research synthesis [9] and systematic
literature review [10, 11]. The methodology is composed of 4 steps. First, we
define the research questions (Section 2.1). Second, we perform an extensive
literature search (Section 2.2). Third, we select the relevant papers found in
the previous step (Section 2.3). Fourth, we classify the literature in terms of
problems and solutions (Section 2.4).
2.1. Research identification
Our goal is to identify, classify, and evaluate the literature related to work-
flow satisfiability. To do so, we started by examining classic papers in this
domain (e.g., [12, 13]) and identified the following research questions (RQ) to
be answered:
RQ1 What kinds of control-flow patterns and authorization constraints are
currently supported by WSP solutions?
RQ2 What related problems have been defined in the literature and how are
they solved?
RQ3 What are the current research challenges in the WSP and related problems?
The first question (RQ1) concerns the current state of solutions to the
WSP and its many variants (e.g., ordered WSP [14], valued WSP [15], and
run-time WSP [16]). An answer to this question helps us in identifying a broad
set of relevant related work. The second question (RQ2) concerns currently
identified problems that have a strong connection to the WSP (e.g., resiliency [13],
feasibility [17], and minimum users [18]). An answer to this question enlarges the
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Figure 1: Literature search and selection
set of relevant work by considering other problems. The third question (RQ3)
concerns the identification of challenges and gaps in the current solutions and
points to possible future research directions.
2.2. Literature search
After defining the research questions, we performed the literature search and
selection process, which is shown in Figure 1 and detailed in the next sections.
The process was composed of 5 steps (the rectangles at the top of Figure 1),
each producing as output a set of papers (the rectangles at the bottom of the
same Figure). The number of papers in each set in shown in parentheses and
the arrows represent the flow of the steps.
We performed a semi-automated search for literature published until June,
2017 using Google Scholar1, which indexes popular computer science research
repositories, e.g., ACM DL2, IEEE Xplore3, SpringerLink4, DBLP5, and arXiv6.
Since Google scholar does not have a publicly available search API, we used
the scholar.py7 crawler. The search terms used were “workflow satisfiability”,
“workflow resilience”, “workflow resiliency”, and “workflow feasibility”. We
excluded patents from the search. The number of potentially relevant papers
after this first step was 221 (cf. Fig 1). We then automatically removed duplicate
results based on exact title matching (e.g., “Satisfiability and Resiliency in
Workflow Authorization Systems” [13] is a result for the queries “workflow
satisfiability” and “workflow resiliency”). The resulting number of unique
potentially relevant papers was 196 (cf. Fig 1). The next steps in the literature
selection were performed manually.
2.3. Literature selection
We started by reading the title, abstract, and keywords of the results from
the previous step. Many results contain exactly the terms used in the search
1http://scholar.google.com/
2http://dl.acm.org/
3http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
4http://link.springer.com/
5http://dblp.uni-trier.de/
6http://arxiv.org
7https://github.com/ckreibich/scholar.py
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Table 1: Classification of the papers
Problem Approach Papers
WSP Initial works [7] [22] [23] [12] [24] [25] [13]
FPT algorithms [26] [27] [14] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34]
[35] [36] [37]
Model checking [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [16]
[47] [48] [49]
Others [50] [51] [52] [53] [20] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58]
[59] [60] [61] [62] [63]
Resiliency Static, dynamic [13] [64]
Quantitative [65] [66] [67] [68] [69]
Others [70] [71] [72]
Others Workflow feasibility [17] [73]
WSP with delegation [74] [75] [76] [77] [78]
Minimum users [18] [19] [79] [64] [43]
Purpose [80] [81]
Policy properties [82] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [15] [88] [89]
but are out of scope for this paper. For instance, terms such as “feasibility”
and “resiliency” have different meanings outside the access control and security
literature. Most PhD theses and papers from the arXiv repository were also
removed, because their contents are described in other publications. After this
step, we were left with 77 papers to read. We then proceeded to fully read
these papers and check if they were relevant to the survey. In some cases, even
though the title and abstract indicate that the paper is relevant, it turns out
not to be. After reading all the papers, we identified 63 unique relevant papers.
Since there are many different “names” for the WSP and related problems (e.g.,
policy-based deadlock [19], obstruction [20]), our search did not capture every
relevant paper (we did not include keywords such as “obstruction” in our search
since it greatly increases the number of irrelevant results). We then extended
the set of relevant papers by manually checking the references of the papers in
the set and adding the relevant papers that we missed during the initial search
(this process is known in literature review as backward snowballing [21]). In the
end, the total number relevant papers was 78. We proceeded by analyzing the
relevant papers and classifying them.
2.4. Results
Table 1 shows how we classified the relevant papers. There are three main
categories of works, based on the problem solved (column ‘Problem’): WSP,
resiliency, and others. Each category has sub-categories, based on the approach
taken (column ‘Approach’), e.g., fixed-parameter tractable (FPT) algorithms and
model checking. We list the papers in each category and sub-category (column
‘Papers’). Notice that some papers appear in two categories because they solve
two problems (e.g., [13] is classified as “initial works” for the WSP and as “static,
dynamic” for workflow resiliency.)
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Figure 2: Distribution of the papers by year of publication
We describe all the papers in Sections 4, 5, and 6, ignoring formal details,
but presenting the main results and key intuitions behind each work. Before
presenting the papers in more detail, though, we outline the literature in terms
of year and venue of publication, as well as author affiliation.
Figure 2 shows a histogram with the number of papers by year, from 1997 to
2017, while Table 2 shows the venues and journals where research in this area is
usually published (the Table only shows those venues and journals with more
than one publication). It is clear that this area of research is more popular
than ever, with the number of papers growing each year and 2016 being the
most popular year so far (16 papers). The most popular venue for research is
SACMAT, with 13 papers, and the most popular journal is ACM TOPS, with
68.
Figure 3 shows, on the left, the distribution of papers by type of publication
(conference, workshop or journal); in the middle, the distribution of papers by
field of the venue where they were published (security, software engineering,
which includes BPM, and others, e.g., algorithms, theory, etc.); and on the right,
the distribution of authors by type of affiliation (academia, industry or both).
The pie charts show relative numbers and absolute numbers in parentheses. As
expected, most works are published in conferences (40 papers) about security
(48) by authors working in academia. Figure 4 shows the distribution of authors
by country of affiliation. In Figures 3 and 4, each author is counted only once,
even if he/she has published more than one paper. The total number of authors
is 103, which mostly work in academia (89), either in the United States (22) or
in Europe (56 authors from 6 countries).
8SACMAT was called ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) until 2000,
whereas TOPS was called ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
until 2017
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Table 2: Journals and venues with more than one publication
Venue Acronym #
ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies SACMAT 13
ACM Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy CODASPY 3
Business Process Management Workshops BPMW 3
Computer Security Foundations Symposium CSF 3
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security ESORICS 3
International Frontiers of Algorithmics Workshop FAW 3
International Workshop on Security and Trust Management STM 3
ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communica-
tions Security
ASIACCS 2
IFIP Conference on Data and Applications Security and Privacy DBSec 2
International Workshop on Software Engineering for Resilient
Systems
SERENE 2
Journal Acronym #
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security TOPS 6
Journal of Computer Security JCS 3
Conferences 51.28%  (40)
Workshops
20.51%  (16)
Journals
28.21%  (22)
Security
61.54%  (48)
Software 
Engineering
12.82%  (10)
Others
25.64%  (20)
Academia
86.41%  (89)
Industry
11.65%  (12)
Both
1.94%  (2)
Figure 3: Distribution of papers by type of publication (left) and field (middle). Distribution
of authors by type of affiliation (right)
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Figure 4: Distribution of the authors by country of affiliation
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Figure 5: Loan Origination Process in BPMN (left) and authorization policy (right)
3. Workflows and authorization
To understand why there are so many variants of the WSP and so many
different possible solutions, it is necessary to understand the relationship between
workflow models and authorization, as well as how security-sensitive workflows
are specified.
A workflow specification spans at least three perspectives: control-flow,
data-flow, and authorization (also called the resource perspective) [2]. Control-
flow constrains the execution order of the tasks (e.g., sequential, parallel, or
alternative execution); the data-flow defines the various data objects consumed
or produced by these tasks; and the authorization specifies the organizational
actors responsible for the execution of the tasks in the form of authorization
policies and constraints. These three dimensions are interconnected, as each one
of them influences the others. The set of behaviors (i.e., possible executions of
the workflow) allowed by the control-flow is further constrained by conditions
on the data, as well as by user assignments and constraints in the authorization
perspective.
Consider a simple Loan Origination Process with fours tasks (as shown in
Figure 5 using the BPMN notation [90]): Request Loan (t1), Evaluate External
Credit Rating (t2), Evaluate Internal Credit Rating (t3), and Approve Loan (t4).
If task t1 has to be executed first, followed by t2 and t3 (in any order), followed
by t4, then the behaviors t1, t2, t3, t4 and t1, t3, t2, t4 are allowed, whereas, e.g.,
t1, t4, t3, t2 is not (where t1, . . . , tn represents a sequence of n tasks executed
in order, i.e., ti+1 is executed after ti). Now imagine that t2 is only executed
for loans of more than 10k Euro, then behavior t1, t3, t4 becomes allowed, but
only for some instances (those where the data object “loan amount” is less than
10k). If the organization running this workflow adopts the policy shown on the
fight of Figure 5 and the SoD constraints between t2 and t3 and between t3
and t4 (shown as dashed lines labeled by 6= in the Figure), then any behavior
containing, e.g., t2(a) and t3(a) is not allowed (where t(u) means that user u
executes task t).
Given the conflicting goals of business compliance and business continuity,
finding good (or even optimal) trade-offs has been a topic of research in the
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Business Process Management (BPM) and security communities. The problems
raised by these opposing views are further complicated by the interplay between
the three perspectives (control-flow, data-flow, and authorization) introduced
above. Notice that a common practice in the analysis of workflow satisfiability
and resiliency is to abstract away from parts of a workflow specification. For
instance, few works take into account the data-flow (some completely disregard
it, e.g. [36], and some model it with non-deterministic decisions, e.g., [20]). It is
also usual practice to limit the allowed control-flow constructs and supported
authorization constraints. Different formulations of the WSP are concerned
with at least three dimensions: control-flow models, supported authorization
constraints, and problem setting.
3.1. Control-flow
There are three basic categories of control-flow support: linear workflows,
which only admit a sequential execution of tasks (e.g., [22]); partial orders, which
also allow parallel executions (e.g., [36]); and others (e.g., CSP [91] and Petri
nets [92]), which add support for conditional branches and loops (e.g., [20]). It is
known that a family of partial orders is needed to characterize one Petri net [93],
which means that modeling the control-flow with Petri nets has the advantage of
compactly representing a workflow that has to be specified as potentially many
partial orders. It is also always possible to obtain a safe Petri net from a CSP
process [94]. As described in [88], conditional execution can lead to execution
paths of different lengths, which means that WSP solutions that try to assign
users to every task in a workflow cannot be immediately applied.
3.2. Authorization
A plan pi : T → U , where T is the finite set of tasks in the workflow and U is
a finite set of users, is an assignment of tasks to users representing a workflow
execution where (t, u) ∈ pi means that user u takes the responsibility of executing
task t. An authorization constraint c ∈ C can be seen as a pair (T ′,Θ), where
T ′ ⊆ T is called the scope of c and Θ is a set of functions θ : T ′ → U [36].
The functions in Θ specify the assignments of tasks to users that satisfy the
constraint. Instead of enumerating every function θ ∈ Θ, it is common to define
Θ implicitly by using a specification device. Several classes of authorization
constraints for workflows have been identified in the literature. They can all be
used, with some ingenuity, to define the functions θ ∈ Θ, so they can be recast
in the form (T ′,Θ) shown above [31].
Counting constraints are of the form (tl, tr, T
′), where 1 ≤ tl ≤ tr ≤ k. A
plan satisfies a counting constraint if a user performs either no tasks in
T ′ or between tl and tr tasks. One example of counting constraint is
(1, 2, {t1, t2, t3}), which is satisfied if a user u1 executes 0, 1 or 2 tasks
among those in {t1, t2, t3}.
Entailment constraints are of the form (T1, T2, ρ), where T1 ∪ T2 = T ′ and
ρ ⊆ U × U . A plan satisfies an entailment constraint iff there exist t1 ∈ T1
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and t2 ∈ T2 such that (pi(t1), pi(t2)) ∈ ρ. In Type 1 constraints, both
sets T1 and T2 are singletons. In Type 2 constraints, at least one of the
sets must be a singleton, whereas in Type 3 there are no restrictions
on the cardinality of sets. Examples of Type 1, 2 and 3 constraints are
({t1}, {t2}, 6=}), ({t1, t2}, {t3}, 6=}), and ({t1, t2}, {t3, t4}, 6=}), respectively.
The first constraint is satisfied if a user u1 executes t1 and u2 executes
t2 (because u1 6= u2). The second and third constraints are satisfied if u1
executes t1 and u2 executes t3. Those are examples of SoD constraints,
BoD constraints can be similarly defined by using = instead of 6=. A special
class of Type 1 constraints are equivalence-based constraints, of the form
(t1, t2,∼), where ∼ is an equivalence relation on U . A plan satisfies this
kind of constraint if the user who executes t1 and the user who executes t2
belong to the same equivalence class, e.g., same role (or to different classes
for 6∼ constraints).
User-independent constraints c are those where given a plan pi that satisfies
c and any permutation φ : U → U , the plan pi′ = φ(pi(s)) also satisfies c [31].
I.e., user-independent constraints are those whose satisfaction does not
depend on the individual identities of users. The SoD constraints presented
so far are user-independent, whereas a constraint requiring a specific user
to perform at least one task in a set is not user-independent [32].
Class-independent constraints are those whose satisfaction depends only
on the equivalence classes that users belong to [36]. Formally, let c be a
constraint, ∼ be an equivalence relation on U , U∼ be the set of equivalence
classes induced by ∼, and u∼ ∈ U∼ be the equivalence class containing
u. Then, for any plan pi, we can define a function pi∼ : T → U∼ as
pi∼(t) = (pi(t))∼. Finally, c is class-independent for ∼ if for any function θ,
θ∼ ∈ Θ implies θ ∈ Θ, and for any permutation φ : U∼ → U∼, θ∼ ∈ Θ∼
implies φ ◦ θ∼ ∈ Θ∼ [36]. One example of class-independent constraint is
({t1}, {t2},∼), where the classes induced by ∼ corresponds to departments
of a company. This constraint is satisfied if u(t1) ∼ u(t2), i.e., the user
executing t1 and the user executing t2 are in the same department. Indeed,
every equivalence constraint (t1, t2,∼) (or (t1, t2, 6∼)) is class-independent
and every user-independent constraint is class-independent with respect to
the identity relation [36].
Other approaches to authorization constraint specification include Bertino
et al.’s constraint specification language [22] and Li and Wang’s Separation of
Duties Algebra (SoDA) [95]. The first is based on rules built on pre-defined
logic predicates. The resulting set of rules, called constraint base, is a stratified
normal program. The second is an algebra for high-level policies that allows to
express and formalize policies based on users’ attributes and the number of users
executing tasks. The policies are enforced by low-level mechanisms such as static
and dynamic separation of duties in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [96].
Unlike for control-flow, it is not easy to classify authorization constraints
in terms of expressiveness, partly because there are many different frameworks
10
Figure 6: Constraint classes
to express them. For instance, entailment constraints of Type 3 clearly include
those of Types 1 and 2, but counting constraints can also be used to express
some forms of SoD [88], so entailment and counting constraints are not disjoint
(i.e., in some cases, it is possible to express the same set of behaviors using a
counting constraint or an entailment one). Also, clearly user-independent and
class-independent constraints subsume parts of the other classes, but it is not
clear which parts.
Figure 6 shows an attempt to systematically classify some classes of au-
thorization constraints for workflow systems presented in the literature. The
Figure shows the sets Ent . of entailment constraints (the subsets of constraints
of Types 1, 2, and 3 are not shown to keep the figure readable), Count . of
counting constraints, Eq . of equivalence constraints, CI of class-independent
constraints and UI of user-independent constraints. Naturally, Eq . ⊂ Ent . and
CI . ⊂ Ent ., since an equivalence relation is an instance of a binary relation. The
facts UI ⊂ CI and Eq . ⊂ CI were shown by Crampton et al. [36].
The Figure also shows the following intersections: I1 = Ent . ∩ Count .,
I2 = Eq . ∩ Count ., I3 = Eq . ∩UI , I4 = Count . ∩UI , I5 = Count . ∩ CI .
We can show that these intersections are non-empty by using SoD and BoD
constraints as examples. I1 and I2 are non-empty because SoD and BoD can be
specified using entailment: (t1, t2, 6=) and (t1, 2,=), resp.; counting: (1, 1, {t1, t2})
and (2, 2, {t1, t2}), resp.; or equivalence, since = is an equivalence relation. I3,
I4, and I5 are non-empty because both constraints are user-independent [32],
which also makes them class-independent [36].
To the best of our knowledge, there has never been a comparison between
the expressive power of other frameworks, e.g., SoDA and the constraint classes
defined by Crampton et al. In any case, the most widely adopted kinds of
constraints in practice (and in the examples of the works that we describe below)
are simple forms of SoD and BoD.
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3.3. Problem setting
Different formulations of the WSP consider at least two distinguishing char-
acteristics: (i) is the order of the tasks considered? and (ii) is satisfiability
checked at design-time (before the execution of any instance of the workflow) or
at run-time (during execution)?
The separation between ordered and unordered WSP was presented in [14].
The unordered WSP admits as solution a plan pi assigning users to tasks in
such a way that all tasks have an assigned user and all constraints are satisfied.
The ordered version admits as solution a plan pi with an execution schedule σ,
which is a tuple (t1, . . . , tk) such that 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, ti 6= tj , i.e., the assignment
must respect the ordering of tasks defined by the control-flow. The ordered and
unordered versions of the WSP are only equivalent for the class of well-formed
workflows [14], i.e., workflows with the following property: for all tasks ti, tj
that can be executed in any order, (ti, tj , ρ) ∈ C if and only if (tj , ti, ρ˜) ∈ C,
where ρ˜ is defined as {(u, u′) ∈ U × U : (u′, u) ∈ ρ} and C is a set of entailment
constraints.
A classification of WSP approaches in the design-time/run-time dimension
was done in a recent survey [8]. Design-time techniques ensure the existence of
at least one satisfying assignment, whereas run-time techniques enforce that a
workflow instance follows a satisfying execution. As shown in [79], it is possible
to use, at run-time, an algorithm that statically solves the WSP, but this is
very inefficient, as it entails solving a new instance of the problem for each user
request.
4. Workflow Satisfiability
Below, we describe the papers in the WSP category of Table 1. Each sub-
category of Table 1 is reflected on a sub-section. Table 3 presents a comparison of
relevant papers in each category (column ‘Paper’) in terms of control-flow models
(column ‘Control-flow’), authorization constraints (column ‘Constraints’), and
problem setting (ordered/unordered and execution time in columns ‘Ordered’
and ‘Time’, respectively), as described in the previous Section. Notice that,
for the sake of readability, only the most relevant papers described in the next
Sections are shown in the Table.
4.1. Initial works
The seminal works of Bertino et al. [7, 22] described the specification and
enforcement of authorization constraints in workflow management systems,
presenting constraints as clauses in a logic program and an exponential algorithm
for assigning users and roles to tasks without violating them, but considering
only linear workflows. Tan et al. [23] defined a model for constrained workflow
systems that includes constraints such as cardinality, SoD and BoD. They defined
the notion of a workflow specification as a partial order on the set of tasks and
of a constrained workflow authorization schema, associating roles to tasks. Their
main result is to find conditions for the set of constraints that ensure that for any
12
Table 3: Comparison of works in workflow satisfiability
Paper Control-flow Constraints Ordered Time
Initial works
[22] Linear Constraint Spec. Language Yes Design-time
[12] P. order Type 1 Yes Design-time
[13] P. order Type 2 No Design-time
FPT algorithms
[27] P. order Type 3 + Count + Equiv. No Design-time
[14] P. order Type 3 No Design-time
[31] P. order User-independent + Equiv. No Design-time
[32] P. order User-independent + Count No Design-time
[36] P. order Class-independent No Design-time
[37] Conditional User-independent No Design-time
Model checking
[43] P. order Type 1 Yes Design-time
[16] 1-safe PN First-order logic Yes Run-time
Others
[20] CSP SoD + BoD Yes Run-time
user authorized to a task, there is at least one complete workflow instance when
this user executes this task. Crampton [12] extended these ideas by defining
Type 1 constraints, and developing an algorithm to determine whether there
exists an assignment of users to tasks that satisfies the constraints. Solworth [24]
defined an approvability graph to describe sequences of actions defining the
termination of workflows with an RBAC policy, linear or conditional executions
and the possibility of loops. In the same work, the author shows a polynomial
algorithm to determine the minimum number of users per role to ensure that a
workflow can terminate.
Wang and Li [25, 13] introduced the unordered version of the WSP, showed
that it is NP-complete and that this intractability is inherent in authorization
systems supporting simple constraints. They reduced the problem to SAT, which
allows the use of off-the-shelf solvers, and showed that, with only equality and
inequality relations (BoD/SoD), the WSP is Fixed-Parameter Tractable (FPT)
in the number of tasks (since the number of tasks is typically smaller than
the number of users)9. Wang and Li’s FPT proof motivated many later works
by Crampton et al., mostly considering the unordered version of the WSP for
workflows specified as partial orders.
9FPT is a parameterized complexity class which contains the problems that can be solved
in time f(k) · na for some computable function f , parameter k, and constant a [97]. Many
hard problems become less complex if some natural parameter of the instance is bounded.
An example is the satisfiability problem parameterized by the number of variables: a given
formula of size n with k variables can be checked by brute force in time O(2kn). The WSP is
FPT when parameterized by the number of tasks (i.e., k = |T |).
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4.2. FPT algorithms
Crampton et al. [26, 27] improved the complexity bounds for the WSP
and showed that it remains FPT with counting and equivalence constraints.
Later [14], they used the notion of constraint expressions (logical combinations
of constraints) to support conditional workflows and Type 3 constraints by
essentially splitting one instance of the problem into many instances, e.g., an
instance of WSP for SoD/BoD constraints of Type 3 can be transformed into
multiple instances of the WSP with SoD/BoD constraints of Type 1, and an
instance of the WSP for a conditional workflow can be solved as many instances
for parallel workflows. They also showed that the ordered version of the WSP is
FPT for constraints of Type 1. In [28], they showed that the WSP remains FPT
with seniority constraints.
Crampton et al. first presented FPT algorithms for the WSP with user-
independent constraints in [29] and improved them in [30] with pattern back-
tracking. Cohen et al. [31] solved the WSP using techniques for the Constraint
Satisfaction Problem, which allowed the authors to devise a general algorithm
that works for several families of constraints. Their solution builds executions
incrementally, discarding partial executions that can never satisfy the constraints.
The authors showed that their algorithm is optimal for user-independent con-
straints. Cohen et al. [32] demonstrated the practicality of the previously
designed algorithm by adapting it to the class of user-independent counting
constraints and showing its superiority when compared with the classical SAT
reduction of the problem. Gutin et al. [33, 34] studied the kernelization10 of
the WSP and demonstrated that O∗(2k log2 k) is a tight lower bound for the
WSP with user-independent constraints (assuming the Strong Exponential Time
Hypothesis).
Crampton et al. [35, 36] extended the notion of user-independent constraints
to that of class-independent constraints, showed that the WSP remains FPT
in this case and provided an algorithm to solve it. Crampton et al. [36] and
Cohen et al. [32] experimentally compared the results of FPT algorithms against
those of a SAT solver on workflows of up to 30 tasks and concluded that FPT
algorithms are better because those based on the SAT solver run out of memory.
Finally, Crampton et al. [37] extended the applicability of their FPT solution to
support conditional workflows with release points, which specify that a constraint
may be active only for some execution branches; as in [14], the solution is to split
a workflow instance into many ones and solve multiple instances of the WSP.
4.3. Model checking
Xiangpeng et al. [38] presented a framework to integrate RBAC into the Busi-
ness Process Execution Language (BPEL) [90], with authorization constraints
expressed in temporal logic. They used model checking to verify that a given
10A kernelization of a parameterized problem Q is a polynomial-time computable function
K : (x, k) 7→ (x′, k′) such that (x, k) ∈ Q iff (x′, k′) ∈ Q, and such that |x′|, k′ ≤ h(k) for some
h(k). Here, (x, k) is an instance of Q, and h(k) is the size of the kernel.
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BPEL process satisfies its security constraints. Wolter et al. [39] presented an
approach to verify security properties of an annotated business process model by
automatically translating it into a process meta language and using SPIN11 for
verification. Their implementation was integrated as a plug-in for the modeling
tool Oryx12.
Crampton and Huth [40, 41] showed that model checking on an NP-complete
fragment of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), called LTL(F), can be used to create
and validate plans for security-sensitive workflows and argued that this approach
is more robust, uniform, and expressive than previous formalizations. Later [42],
they investigated a propositional encoding with Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs) and compared it with the model checking approach to guarantee the
satisfiability of workflow instances statically or dynamically. They showed that
the propositional encoding is too costly because it has to be called for each access
request at run-time, whereas the model checking approach can pre-compute a set
of solutions for a workflow instance. In yet another work, Crampton et al. [43]
presented three encodings in LTL(F) that can compute a set of solutions to the
WSP. The slowest encoding considers the ordered WSP, while the other two
consider unordered versions. They experimented with workflows of up to 220
tasks. The synthesis of monitors was left as future work.
Bertolissi and Ranise [44] introduced a class of symbolic transition systems,
called composed array-based systems, capable of representing collections of
security-sensitive workflows. They studied the verification of reachability prop-
erties of such systems and found sufficient conditions for the termination of a
reachability analysis procedure. Later [45, 46], the same authors used this class
of systems and proposed a methodology based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT) solving [98] to build run-time monitors capable of ensuring the successful
termination of workflows subject to authorization constraints. This methodology
was extended in [16] with a fully automated technique, an implementation, and
an experimental evaluation. The technique works by synthesizing run-time
monitors capable of ensuring that all executions terminate and authorization
constraints in a workflow are satisfied. In [47] an extension of this technique was
described. It is based on a refinement of the transition systems used to specify
security-sensitive workflows. The refined transition systems are associated to
a suitable notion of interface, forming a so-called security-sensitive component.
The authors then show how to synthesize monitors for components and how to
combine these monitors in a principled way.
This approach was implemented in two tools. The first, called Cerberus [48],
integrates constraint specification, monitor synthesis, and run-time enforcement
in workflow management system. The second, called Aegis [49] can synthesize
run-time monitors for workflow-driven web applications. The monitors are
capable of enforcing control-flow and data-flow integrity, authorization policies
and constraints, as well as ensuring the termination of workflows.
11http://spinroot.com/
12http://bpt.hpi.uni-potsdam.de/Oryx
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4.4. Others
Basin et al. [50] considered the problem of choosing authorization policies
that allow a successful workflow execution and an optimal balance between
system protection and user empowerment. They treated the problem as an
optimization problem (finding the cost-minimizing authorization policy that
allows a successful workflow execution) and showed that, in the role-based case,
it is NP-complete. They generalized the decision problem of whether a given
authorization policy allows a successful workflow execution to the notion of an
optimal authorization policy that satisfies this property.
Burri and Karjoth [51] studied the flexible scoping of authorization constraints
in workflows containing loops. They introduced the notion of release points,
which remove associations between users and their previously executed tasks,
and extended the Business Process Model Notation (BPMN) [90] to support it.
In a following work [52], the authors used SoDA to enforce SoD constraints
in a dynamic, service-oriented enterprise environment. They generalized SoDA’s
semantics to workflow traces and refined it for control-flow and role-based
authorizations. Their formalization, based on CSP, is the base for provisioning
SoD as a Service, with an implementation using a workflow engine and a SoD
enforcement monitor. Finally, in [53, 20], they used CSP to model workflows in
two levels: control-flow and task execution, allowing them to synthesize monitors
that enforce at run-time obstruction-free, or satisfying, workflow executions.
However, the monitor in [52] only verifies if a trace of a workflow satisfies a
SoDA term with respect to the past, being incapable of checking whether there
is a future trace that can be concatenated in order to satisfy the workflow.
On the other hand, the monitor in [20] enforces obstruction-freedom (which
is equivalent to solving the WSP) but in an approximated way and may be
too restrictive. The authors call their monitors Enforcement Processes and the
problem of deciding the existence of such a monitor for a constrained workflow
is called Enforcement Process Existence (EPE). Their naive solution to the EPE
is double exponential in the number of users and constraints because it depends
on checking failure-equivalence in CSP [99]. They present two approximate
solution, one is exponential and one is polynomial. The approximations are
based on solutions to the graph coloring problem [100] and are overly restrictive
because they may return ‘No’ even if an enforcement process does exist for the
constrained workflow taken as input (although they make no approximations
in the other direction, i.e., if there does not exist an enforcement process, the
procedures always return ‘No’). They also implemented tool support for the
specification and enforcement of constraints, but the evaluation was limited to a
few workflows used as examples.
Schefer et al. [54] focused on BoD constraints in workflows with RBAC.
They categorized these constraints into subject-binding and role-binding and
provided algorithms to check their satisfiability. Yang et al. [55] defined several
formulations of the WSP, considering different control-flow patterns, studied
their complexity, and showed that, in general, the problem is intractable. Bo
et al. [56] proposed a method to solve the WSP without exploring the space
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of all possible user-task assignments. Their method is based on an Improved
Separation of Duties Algebra (ISoDA) to describe a WSP instance, which is
reduced to multi-mutual-exclusion expressions, whose satisfiability is determined
by a bespoke algorithm.
Hummer et al. [57] studied the specification and enforcement of entailment
constraints in distributed business processes, and how to detect—but not avoid—
deadlocks. Ayed et al. [58, 59] considered the WSP and its complexity in
distributed workflows, which can be intra- or inter-organizational. They used
Petri nets to model the control-flow and Organization-Based Access Control
(OrBAC) [101] for authorizations. Their approach starts from a global policy
and derives local policies that can be enforced by components running parts of a
workflow.
Jemel et al. [60] presented how the ECA (Event-Condition-Action) paradigm
and agent technology can be exploited to steer authorization plans in order to
satisfy dynamic constraints. Especially, they studied inter-instance constraints,
i.e., constraints across instances of execution of the same workflow model. Inter-
instance authorization constraints and their satisfiability in workflow systems
have also been studied in [61], where the authors define a constraint specification
language and propose methodologies to identify cases in which SoD constraints
result in an anomaly (unsatisfiability is one of the identifiable anomalies, besides
inconsistency and overlaps). These anomalies can be detected at design-time
and prevented at run-time.
Holderer et al. [62] presented a hybrid solution to complete workflow instances
whose execution was stopped because of the constraints. If a log is provided, they
partition its traces into “successful” and “obstructed” by analyzing the given
workflow and its authorizations. An obstruction can then be solved by finding
its nearest match in the successful traces. If no log is provided, they flatten the
workflow and its authorizations into a Petri net and encode the obstruction with
a corresponding “obstruction marking”. The structural theory of Petri nets is
used to provide a vector that may violate some firing rules, but reaches a final
marking that completes the workflow.
Combi et al. [63] studied workflows with Temporal RBAC and the satisfaction
of temporal constraints for these workflows. They comment that there are
currently no approaches to workflow satisfiability and resiliency that take into
account temporal constraints and leave this as future work.
5. Workflow Resiliency
Static, dynamic. Li et al. [102] introduced the notion of resiliency policies for
access control systems, i.e., policies that require the system to be resilient to the
absence of users. They defined the Resiliency Checking Problem (RCP), which
amounts to checking if an access control state satisfies a given resiliency policy.
Wang and Li [13] then studied resiliency in workflow systems and its relation to
the WSP, defining three levels of resiliency based on when the users are allowed to
be absent and whether they are allowed to return. In static resiliency, a number
of users may be absent before a workflow instance execution; in decremental
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resiliency, users may be absent before or during a workflow instance execution,
but absent users do not become available again; and in dynamic resiliency, users
may become absent and available again. They showed that checking static
workflow resiliency is in NP, while checking decremental and dynamic resiliency
is in PSPACE. The authors observed that there are other possible formulations
of resiliency that can be of interest.
The solution to workflow resiliency described in [64], relies on pre-computing
reachability graphs [16] with a model checker and refining them with a given
authorization policy. The refinement is performed by a depth-first search of the
graph to prune those executions that do not satisfy the authorization policy
used in the deployment context under consideration. This is combined with
a (heuristic) method to generate subsets of users not containing k users (by
adapting the pruning strategy from [102]) in order to find scenarios guaranteeing
the termination of a workflow despite the absence of k users. The authors only
consider static workflow resiliency, but they note that the solution could be
adapted for quantitative resiliency by assigning weights representing availability
to the edges in the reachability graph, as hinted at in [89]. This work is an
extension of [79], where the authors define a class of Scenario Finding Problems,
i.e. finding WSP solutions that also satisfy other properties defined by the user
(e.g., a particular user executing a task or a minimal number of users). Each of
these problems is solved by a different refinement of a reachability graph.
Quantitative. Mace et al. [65] defined quantitative workflow resiliency, in which
a user wants to know how likely a workflow instance is to terminate given
a user availability model. The authors solve the problem by finding optimal
plans for Markov Decision Processes (MDP). The same authors [66] showed
that alternative executions may lead to different resiliency values for each path,
and defined resiliency variance as a metric to indicate volatility, claiming that
a higher variance increases the likelihood of workflow failure. User availability
models were discussed in more details in [67], categorized into non-deterministic,
probabilistic, and bounded, with several encodings for the PRISM probabilistic
model checker13. The same group studied the impact of policy design (adding or
removing authorization constraints) on workflow resiliency computation time [68].
They were able to compute sets of security constraints that can be added to a
policy in order to reduce computation time while maintaining resiliency. The
authors then developed WRAD [69], a tool for workflow resiliency analysis and
design, which automatically encodes workflows into PRISM, evaluates their
resiliency and computes optimal changes for security constraints to ensure a
resiliency threshold.
Crampton et al. [15] studied the Bi-Objective WSP, which is the problem of
minimizing two weight functions associated to a valid plan, one representing the
violation of constraints and one representing the violation of the authorization
policy. The authors related this problem to workflow resiliency, claiming that
13http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/
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Mace et al.’s translation to MDP is not necessary since the same metrics can be
computed by constructing a graph where the nodes are partial valid plans, and
the edges, connecting successive plans, are labeled with the probability of a user
being available to execute the next task (checking every possible partial plan
has exponential-time complexity). The Bi-Objective WSP is a generalization
of the Valued WSP [87], which has as single objective minimizing the sum of
both weights. Crampton et al. [89] reduced the RCP to the WSP and showed
how to solve it using an FPT algorithm for the WSP. The RCP differs from
workflow resiliency by considering three parameters: s users, forming d teams of
size t, such that all teams are authorized to access the resources in a policy P .
In contrast, k-resiliency for workflows just considers k absent users and whether
the remaining users can execute all tasks. However, the RCP is always static.
The basic solution in the original paper about RCP [102] is to enumerate all
subsets of s users and check for satisfiability (using a procedure for s = 0 as a
black-box), but there is a pruning strategy based on the redundancy of some
subsets, to have a more efficient solution. Crampton et al. [89] solved the same
RCP problem, using the same pruning strategy and their FPT algorithm as
the black-box to decide satisfiability (by translating the resources in P to a
workflow). The authors mention that this basic reduction cannot be applied
directly to decremental or dynamic workflow resiliency, but they point to their
work on Valued WSP [87] as a possibility to do it, by using weights to represent
the availability of users.
Others. Paci et al. [70] investigated resiliency in business processes specified
in RBAC-WS-BPEL (an extension of BPEL that supports the specification of
authorization policies and constraints). They extended RBAC-WS-BPEL with
resiliency constraints and the notion of user failure resiliency, then proposed an
algorithm to determine if a WS-BPEL process is user failure resilient. Lowalekar
et al. [71] proposed a quadratic programming algorithm to generate user-task
assignments that respect a security policy and are statically resilient. Lu et
al. [72] studied dynamic workflow adjustment, i.e., how to minimally adjust
existing user-task assignments, when a sudden change occurs, e.g., absence of
users, so that the workflow can still be satisfied.
6. Related problems
Besides satisfiability and resiliency, there are other problems of interest
to users designing an authorization policy or deploying a workflow in their
organization. In this Section, we explore these related problems that have been
identified in the literature.
Workflow feasibility. Khan and Fong [17] defined the problem of workflow
feasibility, when there are rules to update the authorization relation (e.g., Ad-
ministrative RBAC [96]). A workflow is feasible if there is at least one reachable
access control configuration where the workflow is satisfiable. Later, Mehregan
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and Fong [73] adapted the notions of workflow satisfiability, resiliency, and feasi-
bility to define a protocol for policy negotiation on Relationship-Based Access
Control (ReBAC) [103] with multiple ownership.
WSP with delegation. One way of avoiding the problems caused by absent users
is to use delegation, a mechanism by which a user (delegator) can share or
transfer a subset of his/her permissions with another user (delegatee), so that,
e.g., absent users can transfer their permissions to available users in order not
to disrupt the execution of workflows. There are several models for delegation
in access control and Crampton and Khambhammettu [74, 75] discuss some
models of delegation on workflow systems, depending on: execution model, task
type, and delegation type. Crampton and Khambhammettu [74] described the
relation between authorization delegation and workflow satisfiability, proposing
algorithms for evaluating delegation requests in different workflow execution
models, such that the requests are granted if the workflows remain satisfiable
after the delegation. Crampton and Morisset [76] discussed an auto-delegation
mechanism to automatically respond to the absence of authorized users, which
they claim is useful in systems where the set of authorized users changes un-
predictably over time. El Bakkali [77, 78] presented a solution to bypass WSP
deadlocks at run-time and enhance the resiliency of workflow systems by using
delegation and priority concepts.
Cardinality-Constrained Minimum User Problem. The Cardinality-Constrained
Minimum User Problem (CMUP) [18] consists in finding the minimum number
of users required for a satisfiable workflow instance. The original solutions to
the CMUP apply either an integer programming solver or an algorithm based
on a generalization of a greedy heuristic for coloring hypergraphs. Crampton et
al. [15] showed that CMUP can be reduced to multiple instances of the WSP or a
single instance of the BO-WSP. Kohler and Schaad [19] proposed a graph-based
technique to compute minimal user bases to help policy designers avoid such
situations. Their work is limited to RBAC policies. dos Santos et al. [79, 64]
can compute minimal user bases by refining a reachability graph (as done for
the resiliency problem) and Crampton et al. [43] can do the same with one of
their encodings for LTL.
Purpose. Jafari et al. [80] developed a framework for formalizing and enforcing
purpose-based privacy policies. They propose a language for expressing con-
straints about purposes of actions, whose semantics are defined over an abstract
model of activities directly derivable from business processes. They show how
to tie purpose-based constraints and authorization policies and present a model
checking algorithm for verifying whether a state of the system complies with a
set of policies. This algorithm is then used in a purpose reference monitor. The
authors then comment that is possible to define a workflow satisfiability problem
which takes into account authorization and purpose constraints, but this is left
as future work. De Masellis et al. [81] proposed a declarative framework based
on a first-order temporal logic that allowed them to give a precise semantics to
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purpose-aware policies and to reuse algorithms for the design of a run-time mon-
itor enforcing purpose-aware policies. They also observe that handling purposes
in the presence of authorization constraints requires to solve, at run-time, the
WSP.
Access control policy properties. Sun et al. [82] analyzed the complexity of
authorization in RBAC with security constraints by studying fundamental
problems related to access control constraints and user-role assignment. They
developed algorithms and complexity results for a series of problems and related
them to the WSP. Intuitively, one can map each role in their setting to one step
in a workflow, and the problem of assigning users to roles becomes the same
as assigning users to steps. Ranise and Traverso defined an Action Language
for Policy Specification (ALPS) [83] and used it to model access control for
workflows. They showed that instances of the WSP fall in the larger category of
reachability problems supported by their language. Garrison et al. [84] formalized
the access control suitability analysis problem, which seeks to evaluate the degree
to which a set of candidate access control schemes can meet the needs of an
application-specific workload. Part of the solution to their problem is done
via simulation, and during a simulation, they have to solve instances of the
WSP. Calzavara et al. [85] studied the problem of detecting collusion attacks
on workflows with administrative RBAC. Part of their static analysis technique
amounts to solving instances of the WSP. Berge et al. [86] defined the class of
Authorization Policy Existence Problems (APEP), where a positive answer means
that an organization’s objectives can be realized. The WSP and the Bi-Objective
WSP are both instances of an APEP. They also analyzed the complexity of
these problems and, for particular sub-classes of constraints, developed FPT
algorithms to solve them.
7. Conclusion
This survey investigated problems related to the satisfiability of authorization
policies in workflow systems. We did not include other very broad and related
areas, such as compliance, in order to limit the scope of the literature review. We
examined 78 publications between the years of 1997 and 2017 and categorized
them based on problems and approaches to solve them.
We found out that the area is more active than ever, that there are many
variations on the basic WSP (e.g., ordered/unordered, design-time/run-time,
valued), that the study of this problem has led to other interesting questions (e.g.,
resiliency and feasibility), and that some of these questions are even applicable
outside the context of workflow management systems (e.g., web applications [49]).
We can answer the three research questions posed at the beginning as follows.
RQ1 Virtually every group of authors defines their own control-flow and autho-
rization specification models. It is common to limit control-flow support
to either linear workflows (especially in the initial works) or partial orders,
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although most recent works expand this to support also conditional ex-
ecutions and even loops. Likewise, authorization constraints are usually
limited to Separation of Duties in its many forms. There are attempts to
classify authorization constraints, but there is still no common framework
to specify them.
RQ2 The main related problem is workflow resiliency and there is already
a considerable amount of research on this topic. Besides that, all the
problems described in Section 6 either have been identified from the study
of the WSP or can be solved by reusing WSP techniques.
RQ3 It is clear that there is a trend of supporting more complex control-flow and
constraints. Current works already consider realistic control-flow, but there
is a need for more complex constraints (e.g., temporal, instance-spanning)
and authorization policies. Developing a common understanding and
classification of authorization constraints in security-sensitive workflows
remains a challenge.
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